BalkanBlog, Balkans

Srebrenica – The guide for the perplexed

Over a decade and a half after the event Srebrenica continues to be engulfed in heavy fog. Messages about Srebrenica can be divided in two categories. The first a myth about three days on July 1995, a simplistic story line for the broad masses, not overly concerned with facts and arguments, and certainly not encouraging critical analysis. It is based on the repetition of emotional platitudes such as “genocide” and “eight thousand executed men and boys”. The second category projects a propaganda line geared to a more select and influential public. It is based on the pseudo-history of the Yugoslav conflict promoted by the Hague Tribunal and the political apparatus which sustains it. To point out the many questionable aspects of the official narrative about what happened there, The Srebrenica Historical Project has created a presentation Srebrenica The guide for the perplexed a concise exposition of basic facts.

To give a bit more comprehensive picture about Srebrenica case I would like to highlight – with help of presentation mentioned above – few key questions which are challenging the official (ICTY, Western mainstream media) picture as follows:

8000 executed men and boys

How could an allegation of the execution of 8,000 individuals be made and then widely accepted if the only hard evidence in The Hague Tribunal’s possession that points to summary execution involves the remains of 442 persons that were found with blindfolds and ligatures? Indeed, where are the bodies to support the claim of 8,000 execution victims?

In ICTY procedure in Hague the number of Srebrenica victims has varieted from trial to trial. First the standard estimate of executed victims in Srebrenica was 7,000 to 8,000. In the recent Tolimir trial judgment, however, that figure was put at 4,970. Similarly, in all previous Srebrenica trials dealing with Branjevo farm executions, victim estimates were based on the claims of ”Starwittness Erdemovic, one of the perpetrators who made a plea bargain with the Prosecution. The accepted figure was 1,200 victims, notwithstanding the fact that the number of bodies exhumed at the crime scene was 115.

Where are the famous satellite photos that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright advertised as the definitive proof that a crime of huge dimensions did occur around Srebrenica? Why are they under seal for fifty years if they are of such enormous probative value? If they were made available to the public and to neutral experts for critical analysis now, would that not benefit everybody because many persistent doubts about Srebrenica would quickly be resolved?

The laughable reason given for insisting on the photos’ confidentiality is that showing publicly them might compromise intelligence gathering methods. That rationale is an insult to the intelligence of the public because the methods used in 1995 are long obsolete.

As the supply of legitimate Srebrenica execution mass graves began to dry up, and bodies needed to back up the 8,000 genocide victims claim were in short supply, the Muslim-controlled Missing Persons Commission focused, for instance, on a locale called Kamenica. They played down the fact that Kamenica was on the path of withdrawal of the Muslim army 28th Division in July of 1995 and that a major clash with Bosnian Serb forces took place there, with numerous Muslim casualties.

DNA?

The forensic evidence (DNA) is more unhelpful than helpful to the Prosecution’s claim that there were about 8,000 execution victims in Srebrenica. Ten years later, there was no trace of even the 4,805 bodies that in its trial judgment the Krstic court gullibly stated had been “detected” in unexhumed Srebrenica mass graves.Body counting and forensic analysis in the classical sense had reached an embarrassing dead end. The standard forensic approach which is based on autopsies may not have generated the hoped for 8,000 victims, but in a situation of this nature it generates at least some legally useful evidence. The standard approach did yield 947 potential execution victims (442 with blindfolds and ligatures, plus 505 with bullet injuries).

How can it be asserted that the human remains exhumed so far prove summary executions on a large scale when in their autopsy reports ICTY Prosecution forensic experts conceded that out of 3,568 exhumed “cases” 1,583 or 44.4 %, consisted only of body parts, and that in 1,462 or 92.4 % of them no conclusion could be drawn regarding the cause of death?

DNA is currently presented as undeniable proof of “genocide”. However, DNA findings cannot establish key elements of a murder case, the cause and time of death, which is important given the possibility of many combat deaths as well as natural deaths and burials in the Srebrenica area prior to July 1995.

Combat casualties instead of genocide

If you want to use a word “genocide” (for Srebrenica) – then OK, but we need a new word to replace the old “genocide” word…” (Noam Chomsky)

The status of the 12,000 to 15,000 strong military/civilian, mostly male column which left Srebrenica enclave on foot late on July 11, 1995, headed for Muslim-controlled territory in Tuzla, is a key factor in the controversy over what happened. ICTY Prosecution military expert Richard Butler conceded the mixed character of the column, which under international law makes it a legitimate military target.Testifying in the Popovic case, Butler reiterated that position. The legal character of the column and the extent of its casualties are of the utmost importance because in an effort to reach the magic figure of 8,000, combat losses inflicted on the column are conflated with execution victims.These casualties were estimated by prosecution military expert Richard Butler, when testifying in the Popovic trial, to have been 1,000 to 2,000 for the period of July 12 to 18, 1995, and raised to between 2,000 and 4,000 at a subsequent trial. Given the severe dearth of incontestable execution victims, the presence of thousands of these legitimate Srebrenica casualties is at worst an embarrassment, but at best an opportunity. The opportunity is to blend them in with execution victims, thus eliminating the problem and at the same time helpfully raising the victims’ total, even if it still remains short of the target figure of 8,000.

In his latest book titled “Srebrenica — The History of Salon Racism” (Srebrenica — die Geschichte eines salonfahigen Rassismus) published 2010 in Berlin, Alexander Dorin focuses on manipulations with the number of Muslims who lost their lives in Srebrenica. “It is perfectly clear that Muslim organizations listed as Srebrenica victims all the Muslim fighters who were killed in the fights after the fall of Srebrenica,” the Swiss researcher said. Dorin explained that director of the Belgrade Center for Investigation of War Crimes Milivoje Ivanišević analyzed the lists of alleged Srebrenica victims. Ivanišević discovered that, a year after the fall of Srebrenica, some 3,000 Muslim men who were supposedly killed in 1995, were voting in the Bosnian Muslim elections. It asserted that no more than 2,000 Bosnian Muslims had died at Srebrenica – all armed soldiers, not civilians – and that 1,600 of them had died in combat or while trying to escape the enclave. In addition, at least 1,000 of the alleged 1995 “Srebrenica massacre victims” have been dead long before or after Bosnian Serb Army took the town over.

Map of military operations during the Srebrenica massacre, July 1995

Planning the narrative – two years before

The “Srebrenica massacre” is the greatest triumph of propaganda to emerge from the Balkan wars.(Edward Herman)

There is also many arguments about political PR game behind exaggerated death numbers, misrepresentation of early reports and manipulated pictures. Indeed President Izetbegovic according mentioned UNSG Report told in 1993 that he had learned that a NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was possible, but could only occur if the Serbs were to break into Srebrenica, killing at least 5,000 of its people.” So from here are the numbers originating – two years before events in Srebrenica. (Source: UN report The Fall of Srebrenica )

The authenticity and the implications of this shocking scheme are extensively explored by Ola Flyum in his documentary film Srebrenica: A town betrayed.

Bosnian Muslim violence against Bosnian Serbs from UN protected safe zone

If Srebrenica was indeed a UN protected demilitarized safe zone, how was it possible for it to be used as a training ground and launching pad by Muslim army forces inside it against Serbian civilian villages and military positions outside?

There was also a long history of atrocious Bosnian Muslim violence and treachery perpetrated against Bosnian Serbs leading up to the events of 1995.The most cruel crimes were committed by the 3rd Corps 7th Muslim Mountain Brigade, to which were subordinated foreign Muslim fighters, also known as mujahedeen, who came from Islamic countries through Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network. “Demilitarized safe area of Srebrenica” served as the safe haven to this brigade lead by Bosnian Muslim leader of Srebrenica forces Naser Oric. From there the brigade went to implement series of atrocious attacks on the near-by Serbian areas.

 An important issue pertaining to Srebrenica that is almost never talked about are the Serbian victims. The trick of excluding them is performed by simply narrowing down the relevant Srebrenica chronology to three days in July of 1995, while completely ignoring events during the preceding three years. In the three-year period before the massacre of Muslims in 1995, According to the Dutch Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), these attacks “…followed a certain pattern. Initially, Serbs were driven out of ethnically mixed towns. Then Serbian hamlets surrounded by Muslim towns were attacked and finally the remaining Serbian settlements were overrun. The residents were murdered, their homes were plundered and burnt down or blown up.” As a consequence, “it is estimated that between 1,000 and 1,200 Serbs died in these attacks, while about 3,000 of them were wounded. Ultimately, of the 9,390 Serbian inhabitants of the Srebrenica district, only 860 remained…”

Why are these substantial figures (Serb victims)rarely reported or given even fleeting attention in discussions about Srebrenica, although they are undoubtedly an integral part of the overall picture and their relevance to the events of July of 1995 is indisputable?

First of all, because this is precisely what generated the “accumulated hatred” that was clearly sensed by the UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, General Philippe Morillon, which he referred to as the consequence of these “terrible massacres.”Second, perhaps because these pogroms created a motive for taking revenge on the perceived malefactors when that became possible in July of 1995. The latter point clearly upsets the genocide applecart because it posits a compelling alternative explanation of the motive.

R2P based on Srebrenica

One aspect which keeps the official narrative about Srebrenica alive is that the case is the fundamental element of R2P (Responsibility to Protect) concept. The Srebrenica narrative serves as the cornerstone of this important new doctrine in international relations and since Bosnia been used with many conflicts around the globe as tool of western interventions.

First, as former US ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith recently revealed, in terms of the Bosnian conflict “endgame” Croatia’s Operation Storm in 1995 against Serb-held areas in the Krajina would not have been feasible had not “Srebrenica” prepared the ground for it, morally and psychologically. The Srebrenica narrative and the outrage it produced served as a convenient veil to shield atrocities committed during the Croatian offensive in August of 1995 from substantial public examination or criticism.

As Bill Clinton, the U.S. President who had stood by in Bosnia, wavered again, Mr Blair warned that Kosovo was a test of whether civilised nations acted before it was too late. “This is not a battle for territory; this is a battle for humanity. It is a just cause, it is a rightful cause,” he argued.

A couple of more examples: “We prevented a new Srebrenica in Libya” (Hilary Clinton) Recently U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on world powers to urgently unite to end the bloodshed in Syria, recalling the inertia of the United Nations in 1995 as genocide occurred in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica.

My view

Was Srebrenica – a hoax or massacre? I would say both; a hoax due the well planned and implemented PR campaign, a massacre when the Serbs went to trap and used brutal force also against civilians.(Ari Rusila)

From my point of view the myth of 8,000 executed men and boys is busted. It was planed well before to get U.S.involvement with war against Serbs. An essential part of narrative was the death toll of 8,000 and that the victims were civilians. However the figures after decade and half intensive bodycount don’t match. Besides numbers it has came clear that most of the military-age men from Srebrenica assembled in the village of Susnjari and from there under-took a 60 kilometer trek through minefields and Serbian ambushes to Tuzla as they were affraid Serb revenge due their atrocities against Serbs during preceding two years. As for the women, children, and elderly, they were left behind and deposited at the UN compound in Potocari. Quite possibly that was done as a convenient bait to the Serbs to perpetrate the anticipated massacre, but whatever the ultimate motive behind it may have been, on the whole nothing sinister occurred. The 20,000 or so enclave residents dumped in Potocari were put by the Serbs on buses and evacuated safely to Muslim territory.

One can claim that Srebrenica was not a genocide and definition ethnic cleansing is weak too, instead it was a partly war crime provoked by crimes on the other side. Partly as mostly the deads in Srebrenica on July 1995 happened when 28. Muslim Division tried to escape from town to Muslim held territory knowing the amount of hatred among local Serbs and lost their life during this operation. Saying this I’d like to point out that sure there was civilian casualties, innocent victims as well executions which can be seen as war crimes and crimes against humanity etc.

Despite unprecedented efforts over the past ten years to recover bodies from the area around Srebrenica, less than 3,000 have been exhumed, and these include soldiers and others – Serb as well as Muslim – who died in the vicious combats that took place during three years of war. Only a fraction have been identified. Probably a massacre happened but maybe not like that picture which main stream media has offered.

Srebrenica Historical Project

( http://www.srebrenica-project.com/ )

An excerpt from project’s mission statement:

Our broad purpose is to collect information on Srebrenica during the last conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, defined not as July 1995, but more broadly as 1992 to 1995. That means that we shall be creating a comprehensive and contextual, as opposed to a selective, record of the violence between the communities in that area during the conflict. We shall focus also on crimes committed against the Serb civilians not because we favor them but because so far they have been ignored. We wish to redress that balance, but we will not work under any ideological limitations. A corollary goal will be to launch something along the lines of the South African Truth and Reconciliation commission, with emphasis on truth as logically coming before and as a precondition to reconciliation. That is another reason we wish to do a great deal of empirical work on the neglected crimes against the Serbian population. We shall then proceed to explore reconciliations strategies. The fundamental objective of our project is to rise above politics and propaganda and to create a contextual record of the Srebrenica tragedy of July 1995 which can serve as a corrective to the distortions of the last decade and a half and as a genuine contribution to future peace.

Sources and further reading:

My previous articles:

Srebrenica: A Town Betrayed” – Finally a Critical Documentary about Srebrenica Tragedy

Media War of Yugoslav Secession continues

NIOD Report on Srebrenica

Srebrenica again – Hoax or Massacre?

And here is a small selection of articles, documents and analysis, which are also telling the other side of story:

Media War: The Use and Mis-Use of the Visual Image in News Coverage and Propaganda . A study of the visual media war against the Serbs.

Demonizing the Serbs by Marjaleena Repo June 15, 1999 in Counterpunch

One view about issue in video Bosnia and Media Manipulation

Srebrenica: The Star Witness by Prof Edward S. Herman

The Star Witness by Germinal Civikov (translated from German by John Lauchland),Belgrade 2010,

Srebrenica: Deconstruction of a Virtual Genocide” by Stephen Karganovic and Ljubica Simic (Belgrade 2010)

 Analysis of Muslim Column Losses Due to Minefields and Combat Activity” by Stephen Karganovic: .Proceedings of the International Symposium on ICTY and Srebrenica (Belgrade-Moscow 2010)

 Was Srebrenica a Hoax? Eye-Witness Account of a Former United Nations Military Observer in Bosnia by Carlos Martins Branco

Media Disinformation Frenzy on Srebrenica: The Lynching of Ratko Mladic by Nebojsa Malic

Media Fabrications: The “Srebrenica Massacre” is a Western Myth

What Happened at Srebrenica? Examination of the Forensic Evidence by Stephen Karganovic

Using War as an Excuse for More War: Srebrenica Revisited by Diana Johnstone

The Srebrenica Massacre: Evidence, Context, Politics by Edward S. Herman and Phillip Corwin

NIOD (Netherlands Institute for War Documentation)/Srebrenica investigationreport

INTELWIRE.com has published over 2.000 pages of of declassified U.S. State Dept. Cables about Srebrenica

UN Report:The Fall of Srebrenica

The Star Wittness

Germinal Civikov is a native of Bulgaria living nowadays in The Hague and Cologne. In his book, “Srebrenica: Der Kronzeuge” (Wien: Promedia, 2009, published also in English as ”Srebrenica: The Star Wittness) Civikov explains that the ICTY ruling that genocide was committed at Srebrenica on the orders of the Bosnian Serb leadership is based on the testimony of a single witness, a self-confessed perpetrator of one of the massacres called Drazen Erdemovic. Civikov shows that in fact Erdemovic is a pathological liar, he was a mercenary who fought on all three sides in the Bosnian civil war. He was not forced to commit the massacre, indeed his unit was on leave when the massacre was committed. He was not the victim of a later murder attempt to prevent him from testifying, but instead a thug who quarrelled over money with his fellow murderers.

¤¤¤

Standard
Energiapolitiikka, Siviilikiisinhallinta

R2P vs Facades of Intervention

R2P on suosittu suhteellisen uusi termi läntisessä ulkopoliittisessa keskustelussa. Kansainvälisen yhteisön suojelutarvetta on käytetty oikeutuksena hyökkäyksiin itsenäisiä maita kohtaan kun kohteen siviiliväestön on katsottu olevan vaarassa.  Pääblogissani julkaisemassani artikkelissa

R2P vs Facades of Intervention

kritisoin korkealentoisia julistuksia humanitaarisista interventioista kun operaatioiden motiivit paremmin on johdettavissa hyökkääjien taloudellisista, poliittisista tai sotilaallisista intresseistä eikä kohdealueen väestön tarpeista.  Tilanteen korjaamiseksi esitän interventiologiikan käyttöönottoa soveltamalla kansainvälisistä hankkeista tuttua loogista viitekehystä myös R2P:n toteutukseen.

LogFrame sovellus interventiologiikkaan alla ja myös linkistä LogFrameR2P

Intervention Logic for R2P by Ari Rusila

Ari Rusila’s BalkanBlog http://arirusila.wordpress.com

Intervention Logic Horizontal logic

F

e

e

d

b

a

c

k

Vertical levels
Overall objective: wider goal, a project is steered to its attainment. At all levels ►►►►


1. Narrative description

2. Indicators of achievement

3. Verification methods

4. Assumptions and risks

Immediate objective: a desired situation after completion of a project. It should be SMART (specific, measurable, accurate, realistic and time related)
Outputs are items of value developed by the project for the beneficiaries. With the aid of output resources, the beneficiaries should to achieve their immediate objectives.
Activities: to produce the outputs it is necessary to implement a number of certain activities ( tasks and actions)
Inputs are the material, human or financial resources for the completion of the activities

Aihetta sivuavia muita kirjoituksianis:

Interventions in general: Multifaceted Intervention Practices , Is Peace more than absence of the War? and Peacemaking – How about solving Conflicts too?

U.S. practising intervention first in the Bosnian War 1992-95 and selecting terrorist/OC-groups to U.S. allies (More e.g. Srebrenica again – Hoax or Massacre? and Krajina – Victory with Ethnic Cleansing and the outcome Bosnia on the road to the EU, sorry to Dissolution )

Racak fabrication and “humanitarian intervention” aka since WWII first ever full scale bombing operation in center of Europe 1999 ( High pressure to fabricate Racak reports and 10th anniversary of Nato’s attack on Serbia)

About U.S. strategy in Afghanistan: Will COIN work in Afghanistan?

Other related articles: Libya Intervention is creating problems instead of solving them and Some framework to Syrian crisis

Standard
BalkanBlog, crisis management

R2P vs Facades of Interventions

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a relatively new international security and human rights norm to address international community’s failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  When and where to intervene has came more and more actual question during last decades in western foreign policy.  The wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya have been claimed to be justified attacks in name of humanitarian intervention or recently due the R2P norm. On the other hand there is questions why the same nor has not been applied in Syria, Somalia, Burma, Sudan etc.  Official high-flown statements are normally dealing R2P issue from perspective of humanitarian need or to build a democratic state in intervention region. In my opinion an opposite approach is more dominating on the ground – approach where intervention logic is traced from needs and motivations of intervener not from those in mission theatre.

From my point of view the key question is whom the interventions are protecting. The answer may be related to three issues:

  1. Does the implementing power have economical, military and/or political interests in the intervention region?
  2. Is the possible intervention region on border zone of sphere of economical, military and/or political influence?
  3. Is some party in possible intervention region enough rich or skilful to manipulate public opinion in intervener countries to get them on their side?

Looking interventions during last twenty years most of the mentioned three issues have been driving force for attacks. Balkans draw new lines in sphere of influence between great powers, same with Afghanistan in addition that country has also raw materials, in Libya and Iraq oil and gas fields were good motivation as they are also with possible attack to Iran in near future. In all cases the biggest beneficiary has been U.S. military-industrial complex. One could estimate that humanitarian interventions in Africa will start immediately when enough big oilfield will be discovered in conflict region.

Excerpt

R2P – Responsibility To Protect

The term Responsibility To Protect (“RtoP” or “R2P”) was first presented in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001. As the UN debated major reforms of its human rights system, the idea of committing to an international R2P gained support from many governments and civil society organizations from all regions. UN Security Council’s Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict includes the first official Security Council reference to the Responsibility to Protect. On January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). The report outlines measures and actors involved in implementing the three-pillar approach as follows:

Pillar One stresses that States have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

– Pillar Two addresses the commitment of the international community to provide assistance to States in building capacity to protect their populations related to issues mentioned in 1st pillar.

– Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt issues mentioned in 1st pillar.

Creating the facade

Manipulation of public opinion is effective way to get wider support for wars – and their huge costs – abroad. Terrorist and criminal organizations transform without delay into allies and/or freedom fighters (al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Bosnia, KLA in Kosovo, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, al-Qaedea figures now power in Tripoli) while the enemy will be demonized (Serbs, Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda). Number game with deaths is easy way to get attention in nearby regions. So in Bosnia the numbers needed were planned already some two years before Srebrenica, in case of Kosovo U.S. officials claimed that from 100,000 up to 500,000 Albanians had been massacred. When the figure later was near 10.000 from all ethnic groups together the bombings were already over.

With cases more far away from western civilization other fabrications – than number game – have been useful such as WMD’s in case of Iraq, safe haven for terrorists in Afghanistan and probably possible bombings against Iran will be justified with nuclear thread. One should also note that interventions can (secretly) begin before any public decisions (e.g. in Bosnia with operation “Storm” and in Libya special forces operated months before UN decisions).

The used operational chart with last big conflicts has been following:

1st creating imaginary thread (Iraq/WMD, Afghanistan/Taliban, Balkan Wars/ethnic cleansing…),

2nd destroying the enemy by cluster bombs, depleted uranium war heads, contract killing, torture etc.,

3rd bringing democracy and stability in form of puppet governments and ousting local more or less selected authorities.

Official high flown statement of course are speaking humanitarian intervention, R2P, peace enforcement, defending democracy etc to hide real motivations.

Not even the foggiest idea what’s next

One problem is that intervention plans cover only the first stage concentrating to get justification for attack and to get fast tactical military win and forgetting what to do after military success (or especially without it). In my opinion most of the problems in Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan are based to poor planning before intervention. For example in Bosnia despite international community’s state building efforts the country is splitting parts. Since war 15 years ago foreign aid has exceed USD 80 bn for artificial creature designed in Dayton agreement aiming multi-ethnic state with EU perspective. As a result Bosnia is now even more divided, with less national identity, 20 percent of population living under the poverty line, with a nightmare triple administration plus international supervising governor.

In Kosovo since intervention international community has worked over ten years with capacity building of Kosovo administration. First idea was to develop standards (of democratic state) before status (after being UN protectorate), then after couple of years the slogan transformed to “standards and status” and again after a couple of years “status before standards”; now after unilateral declaration of independence the standards have not been any significant issue in Kosovo and the outcome I have summarized as follows:

as Serbian province, occupied and now international protectorate administrated by UN Kosovo mission; as quasi-independent pseudo-state has good change to become next “failed” or “captured” state; today’s Kosovo is already safe-heaven for war criminals, drug traffickers, international money laundry and radical Wahhabists – unfortunately all are also allies of western powers”.

What will be the result with last intervention to Libya remains to seen but something tells the situation now in Tripoli where members of the Al Qaeda-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group – LIFG, are now in control. Their commander Abd Al-Hakim Belhadj, an al Qaeda veteran from Afghanistan, now calls himself “Commander of the Tripoli Military Council.” So when U.S in the name of “war on terror” just killed al-Qaeda leader OBL it now helps radical Islam groups gain power In Libya in the name of humanitarian intervention.

One reason for failures of R2P might be poor situation analysis due lack of reliable information or as an intentional practice to avoid unwanted deductions.

Intervener problem

My conclusion is that the great powers implement interventions whenever and wherever they see it beneficial for their military, economical and/or political interests with or without UN approval while humanitarian and legal aspects are serving only nothing but a facade. One of the main problems with implementation of R2P is – in my opinion – that so far U.S and NATO have been the main actors with or without UN authorization. Public missions included e.g. the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia from 1995 to 2004, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo from March to June 1999 , the Kosovo Force (KFOR) from June 1999, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since 2001 and the latest one is Operation Unified Protector in Libya which began on 27 March 2011. In this framework R2P has reduced to one extension of U.S foreign policy and its needs and interests.

For increasing credibility of R2P principle the role of NATO should be minimized by strengthening capabilities of some wider organizations. The most important actor should be UN with its related bodies.

From European perspective the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) forms good base to develop R2P capacity; OSCE is the world’s largest regional security organization and the most inclusive playing an essential non-military role in promoting peace and stability and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

It is sad that EU has outsourced its foreign policy to U.S., it is blindly following U.S. military suspicious strategies and cowboy policy only to have good transatlantic relations – this keeps EU always as bystander in international politics. However despite this the fact is that the EU already belongs to the world’s largest providers of international assistance so it could have a great role to play in responding more effectively to protect civilians from mass atrocities and in assisting other states and institutions to develop the capacity to do so.

Intervention logic should be applied

 From my perspective developing R2P from slogan to practice an intervention logic should be obligatory and it should be transparent as only through outside critics it can be justified as meaningful tool. I have some doubts if intervention logic even exists related (humanitarian) interventions during last decades.

In my opinion R2P is similar like other development programs or projects. There is identified crisis, problem that should be solved; objectives are defined, outputs, activities, resources (inputs) are planned to achieve immediate and finally overall objectives. This both ways vertical logic should be checked at each level by the horizontal logic specifying result indicators, control methods for achieving results, and the assumptions and risks which will affect outcomes. This procedure and its further developed forms – called as Logical Framework matrix or LogFrame – is normal practice e.g. while channeling international aid into field.

The core problem from my perspective with R2P is that the slogan is serving as facade of interventions not as principle supposed applied on the ground. The logic will be thrown away when real aims of activities are hidden. When the implementing power has economical, military and/or political interests in the intervention region – in the operational theatre – the problems and needs of supposed beneficiaries are minor points similar way than collateral damages are only regrettable side-effects during main mission. By applying logical framework approach to R2P it is possible achieve more comprehensive approach to conflicts including not only immediate intervention but also life after that. 

LogFrame for R2P figure can be found below and from LogFrameR2P

Intervention Logic for R2P by Ari Rusila

Ari Rusila’s BalkanBloghttp://arirusila.wordpress.com

Intervention Logic Horizontal logic

F

e

e

d

b

a

c

k

Vertical levels
Overall objective: wider goal, a project is steered to its attainment. At all levels ►►►►
1. Narrative description2. Indicators of achievement
3. Verification methods
4. Assumptions and risks
Immediate objective: a desired situation after completion of a project. It should be SMART (specific, measurable, accurate, realistic and time related)
Outputs are items of value developed by the project for the beneficiaries. With the aid of output resources, the beneficiaries should to achieve their immediate objectives.
Activities: to produce the outputs it is necessary to implement a number of certain activities ( tasks and actions)
Inputs are the material, human or financial resources for the completion of the activities

Creative Commons License
LogFrameR2P by Ari Rusila is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. Based on a work at arirusila.files.wordpress.com.
More e.g. in my related articles:

Interventions in general: Multifaceted Intervention Practices , Is Peace more than absence of the War? and Peacemaking – How about solving Conflicts too?

U.S. practising intervention first in the Bosnian War 1992-95 and selecting terrorist/OC-groups to U.S. allies (More e.g. Srebrenica again – Hoax or Massacre? and Krajina – Victory with Ethnic Cleansing and the outcome Bosnia on the road to the EU, sorry to Dissolution )

Racak fabrication and “humanitarian intervention” aka since WWII first ever full scale bombing operation in center of Europe 1999 ( High pressure to fabricate Racak reports and 10th anniversary of Nato’s attack on Serbia)

About U.S. strategy in Afghanistan: Will COIN work in Afghanistan?

Other related articles: Libya Intervention is creating problems instead of solving them and Some framework to Syrian crisis

Standard
Uncategorized

Syyrian kriisi ei välttämättä selviä siihen puuttumalla

Syyrian kriisin pitkittyessä on YK:ta jälleen kaivattu apuun R2P periaatteen pohjalta. Libyassa meneillään olevan vastaavan operaation kokemusten myötä Nato on haluton tällaista uutta interventiota toteuttamaan. Haluttomuus voi olla hyväkin ratkaisu toisaalta informaation itse olosuhteista ollessa vajaata ja ristiriitaista ja toisaalta epävarmuudesta sen suhteen paranisivatko vai huononesivatko olot Syyriassa al-Assadin syrjäyttämisen jälkeen. Syyria on keskeisessä roolissa myös alueellisesti lähi-idässä eikä energiapoliittisia tekijöitäkään voi väheksyä. Näitä asioita sekä Syyrian tilanteen sisäisiä ja ulkoisia tekijöitä käsittelen laajemmin pääblogini artikkelissa Some framework to Syrian crisis

Standard
Arab St., crisis management, MENA, Middle-East

Some framework to Syrian crisis

From June 10 the Syrian army began a siege on Jisr-al Shughour, NW Syria; local residents expected a massacre, proportional to the Hama massacre and in one week nearly 10.000 Syrians have escaped to Turkey. International media and public diplomacy is giving its high-flown statements about humanitarian crisis, some states may even demand to activate R2P principles – again. These are normal cover ups to hide de facto inactivity of international community. United Nations Security Council is facing immense international pressure to condemn Syria how it is copying protests at home.

Humanitarian aspect is however a minor point for international community, the key question is how events in Syria will affect on regional stability, what will be the outcome related to Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Palestine and Israel as Syria is a key player in this context. Any destabilization of Syria in the fall of al-Assad will change the geopolitical map of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Some background

Last year, the United Nations Development Program released its Human Development Report for Arab states with the assistance of Arab scholars and researchers. The report stated that the Arab world is lacking in all areas of human development, such as freedom, empowerment of women and education. In addition, nearly 50 percent of the Arab world lives below the international poverty line. For the Arab world to merely maintain its current position, which is at the lowest rung on the development ladder, it will need to create 51 million jobs in the next 10 years. This socio-economic situation might be a common background for Arab Spring.

Syria has similar problems than the rest of Arab world. Several of the modern states of the Middle East were built on a mosaic of ancient religions, sects, and ethnic groups held uneasily and sometimes uncomfortably together by central government. Syria is a multi-cultural, multi-religious, secular and relatively tolerant country with a predominantly Muslim population (90%) and multi-racial background (Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Turkmen).

In Syria, the Baath Party has been in power since 1963. A state of emergency, which was imposed at that time remains in force. The president’s sources of power are the army and the security forces, which maintain a grip on the country. The Syrian police and security services are dreadfully effective and efficient, and that is why Syria has mostly been a stable and happy place to live for the past 50 years – the place to which Iraqi Christian and Muslim refugees have fled for safety.

When the wave of protests on the Arab Street started there was some demonstrations in Syria too. However, the Syrian regime managed to suppress the protest e.g. giving economic benefits, establishing a social relief fund with nearly 12 billion Syrian liras annual budget, increasing subsidies for state workers, creating a university graduate employment program and reducing some taxes. Same time the regime implemented firm suppression of all attempts of demonstrations as it has done years by attacking and squelching all opposition forces. The regime also tightened its control of the media and deployed more people to security forces. Opponents to Assad were using social media to prepare for a mass rallies using proxy servers to get around government restrictions on Facebook. Using of internet cafés is possible but users must register their names and police have the authority to confiscate the lists.

The Syrian government and non-government press openly supported the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, and did not hide its satisfaction over the ousting of presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali. The Syrian Democratic League called for a general strike and for civil disobedience against the authorities. There is big differences between Syrian revolt and the other Arab Spring events. In Syria the Dera’a street protests started with Sunni Muslims demanding that girls attending school should wear veils. The government refused, since veils are not compulsory under secular Syrian law. When the protests grew, the government gave in: girls in Dera’a are now forced to wear the veil.

During ongoing information war it might be wise some times to check also Syrian official position on issues. Real-time view of Syria’s regime can be checked from The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)

Real-time opposition view can be found e.g. from Facebook group “Syrian Upraising 2011 Information Centre”

Fragmented Opposition

The unions are strictly under the control of the state and, unlike Egypt, there has been no strike movement in Syria for decades. There are definitely people who want al-Assad and his regime to go: radical Saudi Wahhabites, Iranian Shia extremists; and the Muslim Brotherhood. Also the peasantry, the public sector working class, and the small and medium petite bourgeoisie in the towns and cities have been harshly hit by the so-called liberalization of the economy and are the ones on the streets.

Many Sunni Muslims in Syria and throughout the region feel that Assad’s Syria has unduly favoured the Alawites, a sect of Shiite Islam, who constitute some 12 percent of the population but control a vastly greater percentage of the country’s wealth.

Al Jazeera provided analysis of the largest opposition parties in Syria that might have great political influence in any change of power: Syrian People’s Democratic Party, Muslim Brotherhood, National Salvation Front, Movement for Justice and Development, Reform Party, Arab Socialist Movement, Arab Socialist Union, Workers Revolutionary Party and Communist Party of Labour. There is almost no national wide organization inside Syria among the protesters, however at local level some cooperation has took place. In the Governorate of Darr’a there has been signs of the organized working class beginning to move, with the trade unions severing all their links with the Ba’ath party.

There is not so much reliable information from the field but it seems that e.g. in Darr’a the intelligence forces were giving orders to the army units but at a certain point some officers refused to carry out the orders and turned their guns on the intelligence officers. Also in Facebook has been separate reports of a mutiny within the Syrian army but how widespread this has been is questionable.

 

Al-Assad has also supporters

Protests get head lines but speaking about revolt is overestimation; there should be at least ten times more people on the streets that one could call real uprising. The Assad’s regime has also its supporters as well those who keep neutral position to demonstrations. So far is the affluent middle class living in Syria’s biggest towns, Damascus and Aleppo, stood aside from the uprising. The Druze community which obeyed its leaders to stay out of it on orders coming from the Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. Syria’s Christians who are the backbone of the country’s business community actively supported the Syrian ruler. More than 100 Iranian and Hizballah officers placed their active experience in crushing opponents at Assad’s disposal. They brought with them a whole range of manpower and equipment for breaking up demonstrations against which the popular demonstrators were helpless.


The nascent bourgeoisie and the upper layers of the petite bourgeoisie (especially the merchants) have been accumulating immense wealth in the recent years at the expense of the masses and thus are coming out fiercely against the movement.

On religious side Syria has a variety of minorities such as the Protestants, the Chaldeans, the Armenians, the Roman Catholics, the Maronite Catholics, the Greek Catholics, the Greek Orthodox, the Russian Orthodox etc. Indeed Syria has been a safe haven to many minorities surpressed elsewhere. So one can estimate that these religious groups are more afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood or any radical or fanatic group leading the country towards theocracy, better them to keep the current Syrian regime in place.

Outside factors

U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice has stated that there is evidence of active Iranian support for the Syrian government’s crackdown on demonstrators. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are being accused of suppressing the Syrian protesters at the orders of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran has denied any involvement in suppressing the protests. On the other hand, in mid-April, WikiLeaks revealed that the US has secretly been funding Syrian opposition groups with millions of dollars.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is also using foreign cards to divert attention from country’s unrest by creating drama on Syrian-Israeli border. On June 5th he allowed Palestinian demonstrators attack in Golan Heights over the border to Israel. For Nakba Day or 3rd Intifada events a nice story was created how Palestinian “refugees” are attempting to return to their “former homes”; however a Syrian opposition group published details of Syrian government payments to those involved in the border riots and infiltrations. Indeed according DEBKAfile Assad’s security machine even paid $1,000 for every demonstrator who cut a piece of razor wire from the Israeli border fence and $10,000 for the families of volunteers shot by Israeli troops before they reached their goal.

The Palestinians in the refugee camps in Syria have been one of the President’s most loyal populations. However after Nakba Day al-Assad can not any more count on them. There was some causalities among Palestinians who tried march over the border and when the young killed ones were returned to the Yarmuk refugee camp, the camp erupted in riots, the anger of which, “was not directed against Israel, but against those who dispatched these young Palestinians to the Israeli border”.

Turkish military intervention?

“If the crisis is spreading to the city of Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria, which are unique in terms of demographic mix of Islamic and Christian in Kurdish, as they may affect any security imbalance in Turkey directly.” (journalist in Al-Akhbar Ernest Khoury)

Turkey is deeply concerned by the Syrian disturbances and not only due humanitarian crisis on the border. Few years ago Turkey had warm relationship and various cooperation with Israel but Gaza flotilla changed the situation. Since then Turkey-Syria relations became deeper. One idea has been the creation of an economic bloc comprising Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, visa requirements are practically removed, cooperation with investments and technology know-how are rising. With Syria, this brought impressive results. Trade between Turkey and Syria reached last year $2,270bn. Cities close to the border like Gaziantep and Aleppo have enjoyed racing economic growth, thanks to this trade and an influx of Syrian and Turkish visitors taking advantage of visa-free travel.

Now there is rumours that Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has secretly ordered his government officials to dump Ankara’s ties with Damascus with all speed; the fact is that he allowed Syrian opposition leaders to meet in Antalya on May 31-June 2 on ways to topple Bashar Assad. The turn is even more drastic as, according Debkafile at least, Turkish PM Erdogan on June 10, decided to move his army into northern Syria border and his government is considering defining its mission as the protection of civilian lives against a barbaric ruler citing the UN Security Council resolution on Libya. There is also plans that refugee camps will also go up on the Syrian side of the border to stem the flow into Turkey and rumours even limited Turkish military intervention in Syria and the establishment of a buffer zone.

The Turkey-Syria common border amounts more than eight hundred kilometers. Ankara has accepted nearly 10.000 refugees from Jisr al-Shughour and it is not prepared to take on tens or possible hundreds of thousands of Syrians fleeing from larger towns like Idlib, Maarat al-Numaana and the Kurdish regions abutting the Turkish border. Meanwhile President Assad has offered Syrian Kurds autonomy, and he invited Kurdish leaders for a meeting in Damascus right after the opposition meeting in Antalya.

Turkey is estimating that humanitarian crisis on the border can worse soon. One sign of this is that the Turkish organization IHH (Humanitarian Relief Foundation) is considering the cancellation of the Gaza flotilla due to the tensions along the Syrian-Turkish border. 22 different ships are ready to rendezvous in international waters south of Cyprus, and sail to Gaza. (Source: Haarez )

International inactivity

United Nations Security Council is struggling with its Syria resolution, this like previous EU statements are anyway empty symbolic acts of condemnation and will not prevent Assad to crack down the unrest. One of the obstacles with UNSC Syria resolution is the experience got from ongoing Libya operation. Eric Walton (Green International Affairs Critic/Canada)hits the nail on head as saying that “The intent of the R2P resolution around Libya was to protect civilians in imminent danger, and not escalate the conflict into a regime-change-by-bombing-into-submission exercise. This creates a bad precedent that will undermine the appropriate application of R2P by the UN Security Council in other crisis situations.” (Source: Green Party of Canada )

The problem in Syria is similar than in Libya. Related to ongoing operation it is estimated that the NATO attacks had not disabled a single one of Qaddafi’s five brigades. This could be true also in Syria with similar intervention. Also thinking situation after intervention the problem in Syria could be the same as in Libya. It looks like there is no one in the Libyan rebel political or military leadership capable of taking over the reins of power in Tripoli and it is therefore assumed that a member of the Qaddafi clan will be chosen as Libya’s interim ruler.

According unconfirmed reports President Barak Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev Friday, May 27, came to an reciprocal understanding on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Deauville about the fate of the Syrian and Libyan rulers. Obama is reported to have promised Medvedev to let Assad finish off the uprising against him without too much pressure from the US and the West. In return, the Russian president undertook to help the US draw the Libyan war to a close by means of an effort to bring about Muammar Qaddafi’s exit from power – in a word, the two big powers traded Qaddafi for Assad.

Energy aspect

Speaking about events and their effects on Arab Street, the energy aspect can not be ignored. Syria is in the middle of two important energy corridors: It links Turkey and the Caspian See to Israel and the Red Sea and it links Iraq to the Mediterranean. The Eastern Mediterranean gas fields have been the subject of negotiations between the E.U., Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Aside from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, the existence of the Levantine natural gas fields is also the reason why the Kremlin has created a military foothold in Syria for the Russian Federation. This has been done by upgrading Soviet-era naval facilities in Syria. Moreover, it has been Iran that has agreed to explore and help develop these natural gas fields off the Levantine coast for Beirut and Damascus.

There is also new huge energy sources in Eastern Mediterranean – first Leviathan and Tamar fields some 90 kilometres west of Haifa/Israel with estimated 24 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 4.3 billion barrels of oil and second a bid north from Leviathan/Tamar fields Syria is seeking foreign investment for three offshore oil and gas concessions. If the present regime in Syria falls the question is who would control these energy routes. If western powers are taking more firm grip from Syria it would also mean that the large natural gas fields off the Lebanese and Syrian coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean would be out of reach for China and instead go to the E.U., Israel, and Washington.


Besides gas and oil also use of nuclear energy is actual in Syria as it is also in Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has decided to refer Syria to the U.N. Security Council after the country failed to declare its covert nuclear reactor, which was discovered and destroyed by Israel four years ago.”Syria’s apparent attempt at constructing a covert, undeclared plutonium production reactor, a reactor with no credible peaceful purpose, represents one of the most serious safeguards violations possible,” said U.S. Ambassador Glyn Davies. (Source: Arcamax

Bottom line

If the Syrian army’s middle and lower ranks, drawn mainly from the country’s Sunni majority, which comprises some 75% of the population, begin to turn against the senior ranks where the Alawite minority (10%, including the Assad family) predominates, the regime could begin to fall apart. So the core question is whether the security forces, on which the regime was founded when al-Assad’s father took over in 1970, will stay loyal.

So far the upraising has been weak and took place rural areas or smaller towns. If the unrest will spread to Damascus and Aleppo and if revolt gets more popular support the change of regime can be a reality; whether the outcome afterwards will be a civil war remains to seen.

If the Syrian regime were to be severely weakened by popular dissent, Iran’s influence in Arab affairs would almost certainly be reduced – in both Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Open conflict between Sunnis and Alawites in Syria would profoundly disturb the whole region.

What is really happening in Syria is unclear and lot of disinformation is spreading. There might also be some biased campaign launched by some international mass media against Syria. The positive aspect could be that Nato’s “mission creep” in Libya undermines R2P in Syria and so may prevent international community to make new mistakes soon.

¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤

Some of my other Middle East articles:

Standard
EU, lähi-itä, siviilikriisinhallinta

Syyria, R2P ja systeemihidaste

Syyrian(kin) tilanne suhteessa R2P periaatteeseen kuvastaa kansainvälisen yhteisön ja ulkopoliittisten toimijoiden perusongelmaa joka mielestäni on seuraava: Kriisiytyvän alueen tilanneanalyysit tehdään puutteellisesti, toimintaohjelman laadinta tehdään sirpaleisen tai heikon analyysin pohjalta hitaasti, toimenpiteistä päättämisessä ja niiden toteutuksessa viivytellään ja lisäksi itse toteutus voi epäonnistua. Kiteytetysti aika-/passiivisuusviivestä lopputulemana on väärien toimenpiteiden teko oikea-aikaisesti ja oikeiden toimenpiteiden aktivoituminen väärään aikaan ja/tai uutisotsikoita kalasteleva näennäispuuhastelu R2P:n toteuttajien taholta sekä tragedia R2P:n kohteiden keskuudessa. (Sivuhuomautus: samaa muuten olisin toivonut ja soveltanut myös Euroopan finanssikriisin hoidossa ellei sitten siinä(kin) ole kyseessä kriisistä hyötyvien tahojen intressien suojelu)

Nähdäkseni ulkoasianhallinnon (liitännäisineen) päätehtäviä ns kohdemaissa on ajantasaisen tiedon keräys ja päivitys; ikävää kyllä tämä tieto ei aina välity lähetystöjen coctailkutsuilla vaan vaatii yhteyksiä ja läsnäoloa “kentällä”, NGO-yhteisöissä ja mm sosiaalisessa mediassa. Perustellun tiedon pohjalta on nopeastikin laadittavassa SWOT, vaihtoehtoiset kehityspolut, tunnistaa ristikkäisetkin intressit (esimerkiksi ylittävätkö taloudelliset intressit kansalaisvapauksin korostamisen) ja tehdä poliittinen päätös haluttavasta visiosta ja sen toteutuksesta. Ja ellei prosessia viedä läpi nopeasti on vaarana tilanneanalyysien väljehtyminen, ilman reaaliaikaista palautetta vastataan helposti väärään kysymykseen/ongelmaan. Samaan lopputulemaan on myös mahdollista päästä ellei vision/tavoitetilan ja yksittäisten toimenpiteiden ketju ole looginen.

Ja sama kuvana:

EC-UN Migration and Development Initiative

Kuva: EC-UN Migration and Development Initiative

Ihmettelen ongelmien tunnistamisen ja analysoinnin hitautta kansainvälispoliittisella päättäjätasolla. Itse yksityishenkilönä kirjoitin Libyaa koskien jo helmikuussa kuvaavalla otsikolla Libya moving to civil war kokonaisen luvun tilanteen kärjistymisestä sisällissodaksi. Samassa kirjoituksessa – samoin helmikuussa – totesin myös Syyrian osalta mm seuraavaa: “Assad has adopted the Iranian tactic of exerting maximum force to break up crowds as they form and giving security forces a free hand to open fire with live ammunition without having to ask for permission.” (Days of Rage on the Arab street ) Maaliskuussa ilmaisin huolestumistani mm näin: In addition, the international community might consider if there is already is some R2P cause to intervene to Yemen, Bahrain and maybe to Syria too in coming days.” (Libya Intervention is creating problems instead of solving them ) Aikaperspektiiviä kuvaavat viimeiset sanat eli lähipäivinä.


LawaOnline

EU:n ulkoministerit pohtivat Syyriaa toukokuun loppulla – kuinkahan monta kansalaisaktivistia Assadin tankit ehtivät jyrätä kokouksen alkukahveihin mennessä. Syyria ei ole ensimmäinen eikä viimeinen kansannousu johon EU harkitsee puuttuvansa. Siksi mielestäni EU jäsenmaiden tulisi uhrata hetki myös EU:n roolin pohdintaan R2P tilanteissa.

Ja vielä tämäkin:

For years the EU has outlined a common foreign, security and defense policy (CFSP, ESDP) and has even created the EU battle troops (EUBG) and established its own European External Action Service. However recent developments in Libya once again clearly showed the insignificant role of these EU activities. One could ask, if those new systems really are needed or could it be better for EU to go backwards redusing it to focus to the original visons and structures of the European Coal and Steel Community and European Economic Community (ECSC and EEC)…Essential in any case from my point of view is that the preparation of military intervention, the decision-making and the execution itself took place outside the structures of the EU which was totally bystander during the whole process. (Ari Rusila: Multifaceted Intervention Practices )

Standard
MENA, siviilikriisinhallinta

Pieleen menee R2P

Jos uutiset Libyasta pitävät paikkansa koskien Gaddafin pojan ja lastenlasten tappamista Naton toimesta ihmettelen suuresti onko tämä sitä R2P:tä – YK:n valtuutus koski nähdäkseni siviilien suojelua. Kun tapot vielä tapahtuivat Gaddafin aselepotarjouksen jälkeen olisi aika ehkä arvioida tilannetta tai toimeksiantoa uudelleen. Jos kyseessä oli vahinko niin osaamisesta ei arvosana kovin korkealle nouse.

Hyvä ettei Suomi tällaiseen pelleilyyn mennyt mukaan ja jos jatkossa kantti riittää esim Syyriaan niin sanottakoon avoimmuuden nimissä jo päätöksiä tehtäessä tavoitteet ja hyväksyttävät toimintatavat – esim että operaatiolla pyritään tappamaan Assad muutamine tukijoineen.

Aiemmin olen R2P operaatioita kritisoinut mm kirjoituksissani Multifaceted Intervention Practices ja Libya Intervention is creating problems instead of solving them


Standard